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Abstract 
Spacecraft design is managed through the use of design requirements. 
Requirements are flowed from the highest level, the overall spacecraft, to 
systems, subsystems and ultimately individual components. Through the use 
of requirements, each part of the spacecraft will perform the functions that 
are required of it and will interface to the rest of the spacecraft. Functional 
requirements are used to make sure every component performs as expected 
and interface requirements ensure that each component works within the 
larger design environment where it operates. 
Writing good requirements is difficult and the verification of 
requirements can be expensive and time consuming. Because of this difficulty 
and expense, it is important that each requirement truly be “required” and 
critical to the overall performance of the vehicle. It is also important that 
requirements can be changed or eliminated as the system matures to 
minimize verification cost and schedule. 
The Capsule Parachute Assembly System (CPAS) Project is developing 
the parachute system for the NASA Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle (MPCV) 
Orion Spacecraft. Throughout the development and qualification cycle for 
CPAS, requirements have been evaluated, added, eliminated, or more 
generically, “tailored”, to ensure that the system performs as required while 
minimizing the verification cost to the Program. 
One facet of this tailoring has been to delete requirements that do not add 
value to the overall spacecraft or are not needed. A second approach to 
minimize the cost of requirement verification has been to evaluate 
requirements based on the actual design as it has matured. As the design of 
the parachute system has become better understood, requirements that are 
not applicable have been eliminated. 
This paper will outline the evolution of CPAS requirements over time and 
will show how careful and considered changes to requirements can benefit 
the technical solution for the overall system design while allowing a Project 
to control costs. 
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I. Nomenclature 
 
ADS = Aerodynamic Decelerator System 
CDR = Critical Design Review 
CM = Crew Module 
CPAS = Capsule Parachute Assembly System 
CSM = Crew and Service Module Office 
GEMCB = Government Equipment and Materials Control Board 
GFE = Government Furnished Equipment 
JSC = Johnson Space Center 
LRS = Landing and Recovery System 
MPCV = Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle (Orion) 
PDR = Preliminary Design Review 
PTRS = Project Technical Requirements Specification 
SAR = System Acceptance Review 
SE&I = Systems Engineering and Integration 
SRD = System Requirements Document 
SRR = System Requirements Review 
V&VD = Verification and Validation Document 
VSC = Verification Success Criteria 
 
II. Introduction 
Spacecraft design is done through the use of requirements. At the highest level, the customer determines what 
functionality is required from the spacecraft under consideration and then those needs are captured as specific 
requirements in a top, spacecraft-level document. These needs are usually operational and can be fairly broad or 
generic. As such, they usually don’t provide sufficient specific information to actually drive a design implementation.  
As an example, the NASA Orion Spacecraft has a top-level requirement that states “Orion shall return the crew 
and cargo from beyond Earth orbit destinations to the Earth surface”. While this functionality is certainly critical for 
the spacecraft, the requirement itself is clearly not of sufficient detail to drive a final design, nor is it easily verifiable 
at this level.  
Requirements are then flowed down through several levels and allocated to the appropriate elements, systems, 
subsystems and components until they reach the final hardware design organization. Each requirement must then be 
objectively verified, with evidence to demonstrate that the requirement has been met. Requirements verification can 
be very time consuming and expensive. Verification is done via one or a combination of several of four methods: 
Analysis, Test, Demonstration or Inspection. Depending on the complexity of the requirement and its verification, 
these can lead to extensive analysis effort or testing. At a minimum, just the documentation of the work completed as 
well as tracking each requirement, verification, and closure can drive a significant overhead to the project. Because of 
these costs and schedule impacts, it is critical that each and every requirement be truly necessary. If the spacecraft 
ultimately does not need a particular function, then any requirement that drives design and verification is unnecessary 
cost and time.  
With the already high cost of spacecraft development, it is crucially important that money and effort not be wasted 
on unnecessary functionality. There are always a variety of functions that are vying for funding. Adding an 
unnecessary requirement drives cost and takes money away from other areas of the spacecraft that present a higher 
need or risk. As an example, money spent on unnecessary requirement verification of the parachute system is money 
not available for risk reduction and testing of the heat shield. 
Given the cost and complexity to track and verify requirements, it is critical for requirements to be added, deleted, 
changed, or, more generically, “tailored” as required throughout the hardware development lifecycle. However, 
tailoring of requirements does present a certain level of risk, so the approach to requirements must vary over time and 
with hardware maturity and there must be a strong review and control process in place to ensure the hardware delivered 
still meets the true needs of the spacecraft. 
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III. Design-Agnostic versus Design-Specific Requirements 
There are two fundamental ways to view requirements. Requirements can either be “design-agnostic” or “design 
specific”. Design-agnostic requirements are those that do not express any knowledge of the underlying system that 
they are flowed down to. A design-agnostic requirement does not consider the system design or hardware content in 
any way. The benefit of design-agnostic requirements is that they protect for any possible design implementation, and 
they protect for design changes that might incorporate additional features / hardware / functionality in the future. The 
downside to this type of requirement is that it imposes the maximum number of requirements and verifications on 
each system and does not take advantage of clear design limitations and approaches. In effect, this is the “kitchen 
sink” approach to requirements, where every possible spacecraft requirement is flowed to every system within the 
spacecraft. Unfortunately, many people believe that this is the “safest” approach to requirements flow. The standard 
viewpoint is that this approach prevents the requirements from “missing something”, and in many ways it treats all 
requirements as being “equal”. This approach to requirements flow is also the most time consuming and expensive. 
Alternatively, “design-specific” requirements takes into account the current design content of a system. At a very 
high level, it could be something like “The system does not contain any electronic parts; therefore, electronic related 
requirements are not flowed to the project”. The obvious benefit of this approach is that it limits the number of 
requirements and verifications to those that the individual system might truly need. The risk associated with this type 
of requirement, however, is that the system design might change as the design matures. One could imagine a system 
that implemented some type of smart logic in hardware to improve system performance. If the new device that was 
added was electronic, then the requirements that had not been previously flowed could become critical to the functional 
performance of the parachute system. 
With the competing goals of minimizing cost and schedule while ensuring that every system performs as required 
and expected within the spacecraft, a flexible approach to requirements flow is best. While it may seem counter-
intuitive that the fundamental requirements can change or be tailored over time, good communications and good 
control can make this the best overall approach. 
 
IV. Requirements Neutrality Based on Design Phase 
At the NASA Johnson Space Center (JSC), hardware development projects follow a standard lifecycle process 
that incorporates design phases followed by a major system design review. The major design phases of this lifecycle 
are show in Fig. 1. 
 
 
 
Fig. 1 NASA JSC Project Design Lifecycle 
 
Once a project is approved, the first step is to define all of the requirements that should be applicable to the system. 
This includes any higher level, programmatic requirements (like design and construction standards, pyrotechnic 
standards, etc.) that govern the development of all hardware within the overall spacecraft design. This can also include 
the definition of contractual requirements and quality requirements for the hardware. This requirements definition 
phase ends at the System Requirements Review (SRR). At SRR, the project’s requirements are baselined and captured 
in a Project Technical Requirements Document (PTRS). In theory, the PTRS is the sum total of all requirements and 
functionality that the system must deliver to the spacecraft. Also “in theory”, this document should not change over 
the life of the project. 
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Once SRR is complete and the requirements are baselined, the design team can move forward with a preliminary 
design of the hardware. During this phase, the team is developing system design and performance, with many final 
choices and decisions to come. Once the design has reached a sufficient maturity that risks are well understood and a 
conceptual design is available, a Preliminary Design Review (PDR) is held. At PDR, external experts and stakeholders 
review the design and the team takes actions to resolve to ensure that the design is sufficiently mature and feasible.  
Once all of the actions from PDR are complete, the team can move into final, detailed design of the system. This 
is where all design choices are completed and complete system analysis is performed. This is also the phase during 
which verifications for each requirement are proposed. Once the design is complete, the team conducts a Critical 
Design Review (CDR) to document the proposed final design solution. One of the key documents delivered during 
PDR is a Verification and Validation Document (V&VD). This V&VD has a verification success criteria (VSC) 
written for each requirement. The VSC is the objective evidence that will be required to demonstrate that the 
requirement has been successfully met or implemented. 
The design documented at CDR then undergoes final assembly and qualification testing to produce all of the 
required evidence (analysis, test, inspection or demonstration) for each requirement. This qualification and 
certification ends with a System Acceptance Review (SAR). At SAR, the final design is documented, with appropriate 
flight hardware delivered. Each requirement is verified and objective evidence is provided that all requirements have 
been met. This is the end of the design and development phase for the system, and it moves into production and 
ongoing, sustaining engineering. 
Throughout all of these phases, the PTRS contains the requirements, the design goals that the system must meet. 
It is important to remember that the PTRS is not only the source of all the functions required of the system, it is also 
a limiting document to prevent additional functions from being added to the system. Additional functionality, 
hardware and design features all cost time, money and mass to implement. Given that all three of these can be 
extremely limited on a spacecraft, it is important to realize that if a function is not in the PTRS, then that function is 
not required and should not be implemented in the final design. Engineers always want to do the best job possible and 
adding features and functionality is often viewed as “better”. In spacecraft design, the PTRS acts to limit these 
additions and “improvements” and so ensures that the hardware delivers does only what is required at the minimum 
cost, schedule and mass. 
Clearly, the design of the system matures throughout this lifecycle. The design team understands exactly what 
components and functionality are included in the system by CDR. At PDR, there is typically just an idea or rough 
design of the system. As the design becomes better understood, it is natural that the requirements would also become 
better understood. It is also natural that the type of requirements themselves would change over this lifecycle, with 
certain “not applicable” requirements being dropped while other, new requirements could be added as the higher level 
system is matured. The entire spacecraft design team is becoming “smarter” throughout the lifecycle of the design and 
it is entirely reasonable that the requirements should change to reflect this. In effect, requirements change from being 
design-agnostic early in the life of a project to more design-specific as the project matures and the actual hardware 
design and content becomes better understood. 
  
V. Capsule Parachute Assembly System Approach  
A. CPAS Context Within the Orion Spacecraft 
The Capsule Parachute Assembly System (CPAS) is a government furnished equipment (GFE) parachute system 
for the NASA Orion Crew and Service Module (CSM), within the overall Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle (MPCV) 
Program. As a GFE project, CPAS is led by the NASA JSC Engineering Directorate personnel, with contractor and 
sub-contractor design, development, analysis and testing support. GFE projects within the Orion program report 
through and deliver hardware to the Government Equipment and Materials Control Board (GEMCB). The GEMCB 
is a multi-disciplinary board that includes representation of the prime contractor, JSC engineering, safety, quality and 
other technical experts as required. In addition, CPAS reports through engineering via the Landing and Recovery 
System (LRS) Manager. This structure is shown in Fig. 2. 
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Fig. 2 CPAS GFE Reporting Structure 
 
As a GFE Project, CPAS had the opportunity to work directly with the “customer” via the GEMCB to ensure that 
cost, schedule and risk were carefully managed. This board had final decision making ability to add, modify or delete 
requirements for CPAS, with input from the prime contractor and JSC engineering. This unique relationship made 
requirements tailoring very efficient for CPAS, as proposed changes to requirements could be coordinated through 
the GEMCB, with final decisions made quickly. The GMECB also provided oversight and guidance as spacecraft 
systems changed. Effectively, there was a two-way process that allowed for requirements review; CPAS could propose 
requirements for modification / deletion and have these reviewed and approved by the GEMCB, and other spacecraft 
systems and the prime contractor could bring requirements changes to the GEMCB and have these modified / added 
or deleted from the CPAS baseline. This structure worked very well for CPAS, as the GEMCB customer was 
responsible for delivering a high-reliability parachute system to the spacecraft but was also responsible for managing 
the costs associated with that system. 
B. CPAS Requirements Changes 
CPAS requirements are flowed down from this spacecraft level through the spacecraft prime contractor. NASA 
spacecraft requirements are flowed to the prime contractor. It is then the responsibility of this prime contractor to 
provide the entire spacecraft to NASA. Several systems and projects within the spacecraft were identified as being 
appropriate for GFE, based on expertise, risk, schedule and other factors. This GFE hardware is then provided to the 
prime contractor for integration into the vehicle. The requirements flow for CPAS is shown in Fig. 3 
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Fig. 3 Requirements Flow for CPAS 
 
While it is theoretically possible, and perhaps the expectation of classical systems engineering, that requirements 
will be baselined at SRR and not changed, the reality is that this rarely if ever happens. The CPAS requirements 
document (PTRS) underwent a baseline release and then five revisions prior to SRR. At each of these revisions, the 
document added, subtracted and changed requirements as appropriate for the system as it was understood at that time. 
The evolution of the PTRS and the number of requirements it contained is shown in Fig. 4. 
 
 
Fig. 4 PTRS Requirements by Design Phase 
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As this figure shows, the number of requirements doubled after PDR. This occurred because the higher level 
spacecraft design was not fully mature at the time of the CPAS PDR. As that design matured, and as the CPAS design 
itself matured, certain additional requirements became obvious. But, there was not sufficient design maturity yet to 
allow requirements to be tailored out of the CPAS baseline.  
Throughout the critical design phase, it became clear that the number of requirements to be formally verified was 
very high and that the cost to provide objective evidence for each of these requirements could become excessive. An 
effort was undertaken to reduce the number of requirements verified by CPAS. This tailoring of requirements led to a 
reduction from 140 requirements post-PDR (PTRS Rev C) to only 96 requirements presented at CDR (PTRS Rev D). 
One additional aspect that became more clear over time was what organizations would be responsible for 
verification of spacecraft integrated performance, versus what performance would be verified at the system or 
subsystem level. Several requirements that began as a CPAS system level verification of capability ultimately moved 
to a higher level, integrated system verification. The prime contractor was responsible for verification that the integrate 
spacecraft could successfully re-enter, be controlled and decelerated through landing and ultimately survive a water 
impact for crew recovery. Because this over-arching landing and recovery verification requires systems beyond the 
parachutes, it is an integrated spacecraft level verification. CPAS was providing a piece of that sequence, and would 
verify that piece, but the prime contractor was responsible for the overall performance. 
As the CPAS design matured, requirements were tailored based on several criteria; requirements were changed as 
it became clear that verification would be difficult as originally proposed and requirements were deleted once the 
design was sufficiently well understood to identify that the requirement was not applicable. Several examples of each 
are discussed below. While this list is not exhaustive, these deletions and changes reflect the requirements tailoring 
strategy that CPAS employed to manage cost and schedule. 
 
Deleted Requirements: 
 
Lighting Conditions 
In early iterations of the PTRS, there was a requirement flowed to CPAS that said “The CPAS shall perform 
landing regardless of ambient lighting conditions”. At the spacecraft level, this is an important requirement. Operation 
of a spacecraft must include anytime operation, and return / re-entry at night is critical, both in nominal operations 
and especially in contingency operations. The requirement exists to ensure that critical systems do not rely on ambient 
lighting either for power (solar) or for visualization.  
However, at the CPAS level, it is clear that parachutes do not require sunlight to operate, and CPAS was not 
designing for the use of solar powered devices (CPAS is completely non-powered). With these design realities, the 
requirement is not needed at the CPAS level, and the requirement was deleted, with the concurrence of the GEMCB, 
the prime contractor and JSC engineering. 
 
Electromagnetic Emissions 
Another deleted requirement was for electromagnetic emissions control. The requirement as written stated “The 
CPAS shall comply with the programmatic Electromagnetic Environmental Effects (E3) Requirements Document”. 
Like the lighting requirement, it is important that all electronic hardware on the spacecraft comply with requirements 
and work in the electromagnetic environment. Once the parachute system was fully defined, it was clear that the CPAS 
system did not contain any electronic components and this entire document was no longer invoked as required. 
 
Linear Acceleration 
A third requirement that was deleted was for CPAS to control linear acceleration at the crew module (CM) center 
of gravity. The requirement as originally flowed stated; “CPAS shall limit the linear acceleration applied to the CM 
center of gravity to less than 5 g’s in any direction for any parachute-induced load event”.  
This requirement was deleted by CPAS for two reasons. First, the parachute project does not have control of where 
the parachute attachment point is located relative to the CM center of gravity. Without this control, it was not possible 
for CPAS to assess the actual acceleration. More importantly, however, is the fact that the requirement is redundant. 
CPAS has another requirement to limit the amount of load that the parachutes can apply to the vehicle structure. This 
requirement ensures that the structural interface is designed sufficiently strong to survive all parachute loading cases. 
With this load, or “force” limit in place, and given any crew module mass (another parameter that was not within the 
control of CPAS), it is trivial to calculate the vehicle acceleration. This verification is one that moved from the CPAS 
system level to the higher, integrated spacecraft level. The prime contractor still has to verify that the crew is not 
exposed to excessive accelerations during re-entry and parachute operations, but CPAS is only responsible for control 
of the loads applied to the structural interface. 
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Modified Requirements: 
 
Roll Rate 
There was originally a requirement flowed to CPAS that stated “The CPAS shall meet functional and performance 
requirements when the CM roll rate is between -120o/sec and +120o/sec. This is an important spacecraft level 
requirement because of contingency return cases, where spacecraft control might be compromised. However, the 
current state of the art in parachute design does not allow for modeling of this roll condition. In effect, the best CPAS 
analytical models cannot account for spacecraft roll rates. In addition, while CPAS did use an extensive airdrop test 
campaign to verify models and parachute performance, it would have proven to be impossible, or at least very 
expensive to create this roll condition during testing.  
Working with the spacecraft prime contractor, CPAS developed contact models that showed the contact locations, 
durations and loads for the parachute risers against spacecraft structures. With these contact models, CPAS could 
perform ground abrasion testing to demonstrate riser robustness against the type of contact predicted. The roll rate 
requirement was then replaced with a series of contact requirements (one for each parachute type), and these contact 
requirements were verified through ground testing. With this approach, CPAS was able to protect for the required 
functionality (parachute must be able to survive when the spacecraft is experiencing roll during deployment) while 
using a ground test that was both schedule and cost efficient. 
 
Descent Velocity 
A second modified requirement affected one of the most fundamental aspects of parachute design; the parachute 
size, or drag area. Original requirements were written that “The Main Parachutes shall limit the terminal vertical 
descent rate of the CM to less than a prescribed velocity”. In working with the prime contractor analysis team at the 
vehicle level, it became clear that the landing velocity was not being used in their models. In addition, the landing 
velocity is affected by the vehicle mass, which is not controlled by CPAS.  
CPAS provides a parachute parameter and description document. This document describes how to model each 
CPAS parachute and provides parachute performance parameters and dispersions. The prime contractor uses this 
document for their own parachute modeling for use in their integrated performance verification. While it is not possible 
to write a requirement for each parachute parameter, with a mature design the plan negotiated with the prime contractor 
was to control the drag area of the main parachutes as a surrogate for overall integrated performance. In other words, 
given the current design of the parachute system, as long as the drag area did not change below a certain level, the 
integrated spacecraft performance would not change dramatically.  
With this understanding of the integrated modeling, and with the agreement that CPAS would continue to update 
the parachute parameters document, the requirement was changed to “The Main Parachute cluster shall provide a 
minimum prescribed drag area”. This negotiation took a great deal of time and cooperation between all of the 
responsible organizations. It also took a significant level of trust. There are many ways that a parachute could be 
modified to affect its performance while still holding a set drag area. The understanding was that CPAS would not 
make any of this type of change, and certainly wouldn’t do it without agreement and coordination. 
 
Operating Temperature 
In another situation, CPAS had performed testing to certain environmental temperatures. When this testing was 
performed, there was significant uncertainty associated with the thermal environment, and CPAS tested to higher 
temperatures than the models predicted. In effect, CPAS tested with margin because of this uncertainty. As the 
spacecraft thermal models were refined, it became clear that the actual expected temperatures were higher than 
originally expected. The CPAS operating temperature requirements were changed to a higher value, but CPAS had 
already tested to these temperatures so there was no impact. 
C. Requirements Tailoring – Moving from Design-Agnostic to Design-Specific 
While all of these examples are interesting and demonstrate the idea of requirements tailoring, it is more important 
to understand the process than the end results. Throughout the life of the CPAS project, as the design matured and 
changed, the CPAS team identified potential changes and deletion of requirements to the Orion Program. This is 
somewhat contrary to the “classical” systems engineering approach, where the requirements are baselined and then 
are not changed, but it does reflect reality for most projects. The real issue then becomes how to manage requirements 
tailoring and what characteristics are required for a project to be successful in the face of these changes. 
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Integration and Coordination – understanding the “Real Need” behind the requirement 
It is not possible to make these changes to requirements without strong coordination with all external stakeholders 
and all other interfaces. In every case discussed above, the effect of deleting or changing the requirement was reviewed 
with other organizations and with Orion Program management. In some cases, the higher level spacecraft deleted the 
allocation of the requirement to CPAS and accepted verification at their, higher, level.  
Another aspect of this integration and coordination is to fully understand the “real reason” behind the requirement. 
In some cases, the requirement itself at the higher level is just a “left over” from  previous design phases or a time 
when the design was less mature and less understood. In others, there has just been a blind allocation of requirements 
to the lower level. It’s much easier to simply pass requirements down to lower level systems than to screen each 
requirement for applicability.  
The descent velocity / drag area requirement change is a perfect example of understanding the real higher level 
need. The spacecraft system did not need the descent velocity, nor was that parameter being used for any verification 
or design at that higher level. What the spacecraft did need was to control the physical size of the parachute so that it 
would match the models they were using for verification. While it’s not a perfect solution, the drag area requirement 
was put in place as a “hook” to ensure that the parachute was not changed without coordination. 
 
Strong Control – having an Arbiter 
Even with good coordination and integration, decisions whether to delete or change requirements ultimately have 
to be made. To make effective decisions, there has to be a balance between cost, schedule and risk. Spending 
unnecessary money to track and verify an requirement ultimately takes those resources away from other areas of the 
spacecraft that need them. 
In the CPAS model, the GEMCB acted as the control board responsible for delivery of the GFE parachute system 
to the spacecraft. The GEMCB ultimately had the responsibility and authority to accept CPAS recommendations for 
requirement deletion of modification. Of course, these decisions can’t be made purely from a programmatic (and often 
cost) basis, but must consider technical aspects of the design. The GEMCB had representation from all affected 
disciplines, including the prime contractor, Orion program management, Safety and Mission Assurance, JSC 
engineering and other subject matter experts brought in to the board as topics dictated. 
This multi-disciplinary approach led to spirited debates and honest differences of opinion. In the end, it was the 
responsibility of the board chairman to make decisions, based on all input. The advantage that the GEMCB offered to 
CPAS was rapid and certain decision-making. CPAS routinely took issues to this board and decisions were made 
during the presentation. This clarity and decisiveness allowed CPAS to make changes to requirements easily. Of 
course, not all decisions were favorable to CPAS, as the overall interest of the spacecraft prevailed. In some cases, 
there were additional requirements that were added to CPAS, but the ability to make quick decisions regardless of 
outcome allowed for effective requirements changes and tailoring. 
 
Strong System Experts 
Part of the reason that the GEMCB could make quick decisions was because CPAS had a strong group of parachute 
experts who would evaluate changes and make recommendations. The Theodor W. Knacke Aerodynamic Decelerator 
Systems Award is given by the AIAA to recognize significant contributions to the advancement of aeronautical or 
aerospace systems through research, development and application of the art and science of aerodynamic decelerator 
technology. CPAS was fortunate to have seven of the last ten Knacke Award winners working on the project. Experts 
on the project ranged back to the Apollo Program, and all of our experts provided invaluable advice and guidance.  
Beyond this guidance, these experts gave CPAS a technical authority that was recognized and valued by the Orion 
Program. It is hard to underestimate the value provided by this group of experts, as parachute design and development 
can be very empirical. The experience that they brought to all of the decisions made by the project could not be 
replaced. 
The Orion Program and the GEMCB respected these opinions and would frequently proceed based on their 
recommendations. Having this level of expertise on the project provided a level of technical authority that could not 
be matched or argued with. When this group of experts made recommendations, it was hard to ignore their advice. 
 
Risk Identification – balancing spacecraft resources 
Finally, the key to tailoring requirements lies in the balance of risks. While it is always the goal of any spacecraft 
development to eliminate risk completely, that is not realistic. Money spent unnecessarily in one area is not available 
for risk mitigation in another. With this trade in mind, it is important to minimize requirements and verification costs 
for any system, so that spacecraft management can spend their money for maximum risk reduction. 
10 
 
Risk identification and communication is actually a combination of the other factors already discussed. It takes 
strong integration, a strong arbitrator and subject matter experts to accurately reflect the risk that any decision incurs. 
It also takes a high level of integrity and engineering honesty to accurately report these risks to management. It is 
always easy to ignore or minimize risks associated with any requirement tailoring.  
 
Trust 
Perhaps the single, over-arching consideration for most if not all of these changes is a level of trust between all 
of the interested parties. In changing a requirement, it is important that the customer, engineering oversight and the 
prime contractor all had trust that CPAS would not take actions that would harm system performance, functionality 
or reliability. Certainly when a requirement is deleted completely, there is a high level of trust required to ensure that 
something isn’t being missed or forgotten and there is trust required that if something changes in the future, 
requirements can be added back to the project. 
Just as requirements are built over time, through addition, subtraction and modification, trust is also built. This is 
critical to the success of tailoring. Often, requirements are put in place to make sure that organizations take the right 
actions. Trust between all the stakeholders works the same way. If all of the interested parties trust each other, there 
is more willingness to drop and change requirements and less of a need to apply the “kitchen sink” approach. 
  
VI. Conclusion 
Classical systems engineering approaches rely on allocating requirements from the top level spacecraft down 
through various systems, subsystems and ultimately to individual components where those requirements drive design 
solutions. There is typically an effort to make sure that requirements don’t change, as changes are seen as drivers to 
increased costs. However, having requirements that add little value to the design also can add unnecessary cost to 
hardware development and verification. In addition, money spent to carry and verify unnecessary requirements for 
one system take money away from other, potentially higher risk elements of the spacecraft design. 
With this backdrop in mind, it is valuable to consider that requirements changes over time, or more generally, 
requirements tailoring is a valuable method to reduce cost and schedule. When tailoring is done with good integration, 
appropriate controls, strong technical expert support, risk balancing and communication, and, perhaps most 
importantly, trust, it can save a project significant money and time and still allow for the delivery of a high quality 
product that meets all of the true functional needs of the spacecraft. 
